China Expanding its Arsenal.

For the first time in years, China’s nuclear arsenal looks to be growing significantly. China possessed just approximately twenty silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the last couple of decades. However, fresh information suggests that the government is set to build around 200 additional missile silos. China’s current nuclear weapons modernization and updating program is operating at an unparalleled pace and scope. Over the next decade, China’s nuclear weapons arsenal is likely to increase (if not triple or quadruple. If this is the aim, the new silos may be able to help China achieve it. The country’s growing concern is that the US military capabilities, including the likes of missile defense and conventional precision strike weapons, might damage China’s ability to respond to a nuclear assault. The potential vulnerability of China’s nuclear deterrence is continuously reminded by new developments in US capabilities. As a corollary, Chinese experts have repeatedly agreed that the country’s nuclear capabilities must be gradually modernized. For decades, it appeared that China’s senior political officials felt the country’s top goals were more vital than a huge nuclear buildup—especially at a time when China saw no imminent external danger, but that time is passed.

The actions of the other major nuclear weapons nations have had a significant impact on China’s development of a sea-based nuclear capability. Only four years after the United States launched its first nuclear submarines and one year after the Soviet Union, China chose to begin manufacturing nuclear submarines in 195810. Land-based ballistic missiles were prioritized above nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) development during the Cold War. However, when China’s economy grew rapidly, it began to devote more resources to the nuclear submarine and SLBM projects, making significant advances since then. China has deployed four 094-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), China’s second-generation SSBNs, and is developing two more, according to official US estimates and open-source information. Twelve JL-2 SLBMs are installed on every 094 submarine. China is also working on the JL-3 SLBM and the next-generation 096-class SSBN. For China’s entire nuclear deterrence, this developing capacity will become increasingly significant. However, with this increased capability comes a slew of new concerns for China.

China’s continuous steps towards the development of a nuclear arsenal are being accompanied by increased disagreements with Western countries over topics such as human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and international conventions under its present leadership. These developments have led China’s leadership to conclude that the country is confronted with a new geopolitical reality in which Western countries are purposefully causing trouble and inventing excuses to demonise and contain China, fearful that the country’s rise will threaten the West’s dominance in the international system. Beijing believes that Western antagonism is the outcome of larger structural changes in the international system and that the only answer is to cement its own power until Western countries accept the new reality—that China’s success and strength are undeniable.

President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of the Second Artillery—the Chinese military’s missile branch, which was eventually raised to full military service and renamed the Rocket Force—shortly after taking office in 2012, calling it “a strategic foundation of China’s great power status.” He urged the military to “accelerate the building of sophisticated strategic deterrent” capabilities during a major national political conference in March 2021, which was the toughest and most specific public command on the matter to come from China’s highest-ranking leader. With China’s national decision-making authority increasingly concentrated in one person, the present paramount leader’s support for increased nuclear capabilities might go a long way toward shifting the country’s nuclear development strategy away from its previous moderate path.

In 2020, Beijing also began to deploy the dual-capable hypersonic glide-vehicle system paired with a medium-range ballistic missile, known as DF-17. The U.S. intelligence alleged that China tested in July a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on a rocket, that flew through low-orbit space and circled the globe before striking within two dozen miles of its target.

The stakes are raised by the possibility of a clash over Taiwan:

Experts have felt that the free decline in US-China ties since 2020 has increased the risk of a crisis or confrontation involving nuclear weapons use by either side. As the conventional (non-nuclear) military balance in East Asia continues to favour China, one major concern is whether the US would be more tempted to threaten nuclear use as a deterrent to China’s use of force against Taiwan.

Analysts have expressed concern that the US may use low-yield nuclear weapons against a Chinese navy en route to attack Taiwan. If the United States’ nuclear weapons and missile defences combined to severely limit China’s capacity to react, that temptation may be much stronger. In this sense, a greater nuclear arsenal has improved China’s prospects of preventing the US from using nuclear weapons, but it may also raise China’s confidence in using conventional weapons. 

Conclusion:    

Beijing’s nuclear buildup is ultimately an attempt to persuade geopolitical power to abandon the ostensible strategic assault in favour of a mutual vulnerability relationship in which no country has the capability or inclination to threaten nuclear war without risking destruction. China’s expanding capabilities are aimed at strengthening its capacity to fight and win wars, a euphemism for controlling the geopolitical scenario, pressure Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes, counter a third-party involvement in a conflict along the periphery, and project dominance internationally.

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Britain’s moving forward, modernising its arsenal.

The manner in which war is fought is evolving. While technological advancements in the twentieth century helped to level the playing field between states, rapid progress in the recent two decades has made it clear that possessing a state’s money, or even being a state, is no longer a need for influencing global politics. Technology has been the great equaliser and driving force in bringing new participants into the field of battle. It’s unsurprising that we’re seeing a shift in how western countries are organising and developing their defence forces in response to these new threats. The capacity of a country to use its scientific and technology foundation to investigate, experiment, analyse, and exploit new technologies, methods, and tactics will be critical to its operational advantage, security, and prosperity in the future. A national defensive strategy must also ensure independence in defence development and procurement. As technology becomes more democratised, it is no longer only countries with vast financial resources that may arm themselves with weapons of war; it can now be done on an individual level as well. These aren’t your typical gun or tank; instead, they’re non-unique computers that enable bad actors the power to inflict harm on their targets, whether they’re governments or proxies for governments, through skilful usage. This type of behaviour is now considered to occur in the grey zone, which is a space where bad actors can target political, economic, and military tools without triggering a traditional reaction or even being recognised as formal acts of aggression.

Britain’s military has been focused on transitioning towards a more deadly, hi-tech, and drone-enabled combat. A year after formally exiting the EU, the United Kingdom is attempting to define and establish its new role in the world. An implication towards using their unique chance to use their knowledge of science and technology for the improvement of defence and security capabilities, demonstrating their capacity to remain a reliable partner to its European and global allies. It has also promised to invest in cyberspace, chemical, biological, and radioactive technologies, innovative weapons, and system integration.

The UK’s capacity to combine enhanced training with faster adoption of science and technology, particularly those currently in use by its adversaries, will be a vital boost to its preparation. The UK, which has a history of being hesitant to adopt new technologies, has to do more to speed up adoption and guarantee that troops have the tools they need to train and build skills to face more complex technology-based assaults. To accomplish this, a road must be established for the rapid transfer of commercial sector technology to military and security applications in order to strengthen the military’s ability to respond effectively to attacks that originate in the civil sector. Being an early adopter of disruptive types of technology will put the UK ahead of its enemies and give it a leading position among its allies in this field.

Experimentation has grown increasingly common as a result of the success of Silicon Valley’s rapid prototyping and innovation cultures — fail fast, learn quickly, and improve. Several multidisciplinary international exercises, such as the Unmanned Warrior exercise, which offered a testing ground for unmanned systems, and Formidable Shield, which tested eight NATO nations’ defence capabilities against ballistic missiles, have already demonstrated its utility in defence. These help to speed up the development and integration of new technologies and operational ideas by allowing them to be tested in a safe and controlled environment. Personnel may train with limited or high-value assets using virtual and constructive simulations, and real training capabilities can be customised to match changing operational demands. Throughout, a technology-agnostic approach should be followed, with diverse manufacturers’ training systems, simulators, and equipment being integrated to provide the most effective synthetic representation feasible.

By the conclusion of the first year, the country hopes to have made significant progress on this plan. Creating a strategy implementation plan, establishing clear policy views on the important capabilities that the government must maintain, offering direction to academics and businesses on priority areas, and renewing the government’s technological incubation programme are all examples of progress. However, more engagement with people in the industry is required to properly incorporate innovations from the civic sector. Close communication and collaboration between all stakeholders are crucial to ensure development and innovation stay mission-focused. Defence and security services have firsthand knowledge of their operational issues, while academics and industry are always investigating new solutions. And it all boils down to the necessity for a more modernised training programme, both in terms of methodologies and technologies. Training collaborations with businesses and allies will be able to provide the tactical training required to face genuine threats while also strengthening cross-government, inter-Service, and international cooperation. Defence enterprises must work together to agree on common standards and principles for the use of collaborative environments, threads and twins. Only once this is understood, and collaborative culture is embraced, can the time-saving, cost-saving, and performance-enhancing benefits of collaborative training be realised.

Conclusion:

The United Kingdom’s new warfare strategy is in keeping with the direction in which warfare is moving, as well as the manner necessary to confront the growing number of threats. The introduction of science and technology as a pillar will provide the necessary foundation for building a successful defence in the new world’s workings. To confront adversaries that increasingly employ modern media to launch attacks, a well-developed technological capability will be necessary. The first step toward a strong future defence is to recognise the possibilities of science and technology. Strengthening the United Kingdom’s leadership in science and technology offers a foundation on which it can stand shoulder to shoulder with other nations as it redefines its position in the international arena.

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Bracing to the geopolitical complexities, will India-Russia hold up their ties?

Russian-Indian ties have always been amicable. The leaders’ chemistry is great, and citizens feel cordial toward one another. Ordinary Russians regard India as a dependable friend with whom their own country has a trouble-free relationship. For their part, most Indians see Russia as a trusted ally who has never harmed India’s strategic interests in its seventy-five years of independence.

During the Soviet era, India and Russia had decades of strong ties at the highest levels. The morality of India and the Soviet Union were not imposed on one another. When the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, India, which was eager to speak out the flaws and injustices of Western imperialism, kept quiet. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, more than made up for India’s relative calm. It backed India in the dispute over Kashmir, which India and Pakistan have fought over since 1947. Russian economic and military help to India was matched by political backing for India at the United Nations Security Council on the Kashmir problem, when Pakistan, backed by the US and the UK, advocated acting to resolve the conflict.  Despite their friendship, Russia attempted to constrain Mao Zedong and his colleagues during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Following this disaster, Russia increased its weaponry and technical aid to India. However, as the newly constituted Russian Federation strove to reestablish its foreign policy, the turbulence of the first post-Soviet years echoed across the Indo-Russian relationship as well. 

The Boris Yeltsin government had a pro-Western foreign policy stance in the years after the demise of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, India was approaching the point when it needed to liberalise its economy and seek to the West for trade and investment. While a result, both countries were consumed with internal concerns as they transitioned to a new international order. 

The two nations signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1993, and a year later, a Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement. Following a brief time from 1990 to 1993, India became a prominent importer of Russian weaponry, resulting in a steep drop in the amount of arms shipments. Russia’s defence exports to India and China then accounted for 41% of the country’s overall earnings. It was crucial for the survival of Russia’s armaments sector, which suffered as a result of lower orders from its own military following the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and Russia signed $650 million worth of weapons deals in 1992. Since then, the relationship has grown into cooperative research, design, development, and manufacture of state-of-the-art military systems from a strictly buyer-seller partnership. Both countries are presently active in the development of indigenous tanks and fighter planes, as well as the modernization of existing defence equipment.

In 2017, within the yearly INDRA framework, the first-ever TriServices exercise was undertaken, and India became a full member of the SCO, resulting in positive improvements in the alliance. INDRA was once a single-service exercise, but that had changed into all three services — army, navy, and air force — are participating. This development was triggered by the cancellation of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft and India’s departure from the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft programme, which began in 2007. India chose to terminate the latter project after 11 years of stagnation on issues such as cost-sharing and technology. 

The 21st India-Russia annual summit is significant, especially with the arrival in India of the long-range S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system. Putin’s visit drew a considerable interest; it was his second trip overseas since the COVID-19 outbreak began, following a conference with US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June. The importance of the bilateral relationship as a special and privileged strategic partnership has been emphasised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The conference resulted in the signing of a 10-year defence technological cooperation pact, as well as a $600 million deal for the Indo-Russian joint venture to produce over 600,000 AK-203 Kalashnikov rifles in India. In addition, both nations have set a lofty target of increasing bilateral trade to $30 billion by 2025. The conference resulted in the signing of 28 agreements in total. 

Notwithstanding deepening of the relations with the U.S. over the last two decades, India still appears to lack trust in its strategic relations with the States. The country also has apprehensions about Russia’s close defense and strategic proximity with China. Against this backdrop, India is likely to engage both powers simultaneously to counterbalance China while retaining its strategic autonomy. The underlying notions of that of the Quad’s strategic footprint will also expand, especially as China’s tendrils reach throughout the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, the more active China becomes in its border conflict with India, the more likely India is to rely on the Quad. As a result, Russia will need to be more attentive to India’s worries about China’s territorial ambitions. India faces a difficult task in striking the correct balance between Russia and the Quad. This moreover indicates that without entering into close alignment with either the U.S. or Russia, India would engage both as per its security and strategic requirements. In the long term, India appears to have its own ambition of becoming a big power; thus aligning with either the U.S. or Russia may hamper its goals.

Neither India nor Russia, for that matter, wish to be China’s or the US’s vassal state. And one way they may endeavour to avert that conclusion is to remind China, the US, and the rest of the globe that they can rely on each other for support. Following recent tensions with China, India may wish to increase its reliance on the United States. But, if history repeats itself and the present is any clue, it will maintain its connections with Russia.

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Africa-India Defence Ties

India, which possesses the world’s second-largest army, has positioned itself as a responsible participant in the international system and has successfully deployed its force in global defence cooperation efforts. Currently, India has military-to-military cooperation agreements with about one-third of the 54 African countries, especially in the sphere of training. India has engaged in all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and now maintains major contingents in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, making it one of the greatest donors to peacekeeping in Africa. India has deployed military training teams in a number of African countries viz. Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho and Seychelles. Training teams have been deployed in Nigeria and Tanzania also. Defence Attaché is located in Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria. Further, a number of military-to-military cooperation events have progressed with other nations as well. A significant number of military officers from African countries have been undergoing training courses in India at various levels. The high standards of training and infrastructural facilities are a major contributing factor to the same. The availability of English speaking officers, among the African armies, to a great extent, facilitates imparting of training to officers. 

Bonds with South Africa:

Since the end of colonialism in 1994, the relationship between South Africa and India has improved significantly. Despite historical ties against colonialism and racism forging a bond between the two nations, the India-South Africa relationship is now characterised by common political, economic, and strategic goals in which both countries pursue win-win engagements. In recent years, India has increased its global aspirations and foreign policy contacts with African nations. Bilateral trade grew from $7 billion in 2001 to $63 billion in 2018. India is presently Africa’s third-largest export destination and fifth-largest investment. India and South Africa have developed defence and security relations since signing an MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Defense Equipment in 1996. South Africa, as Africa’s only arms manufacturer, sees India, one of the world’s top arms importers, as a feasible partner for defence trade and joint ventures in defence research and development. Because South Africa is a prominent regional power geographically placed in the Indian Ocean Region, India values training exchanges, joint exercises, and intelligence sharing with its military services.

South African forces being one of the most modern armed forces, India recognises the importance of its engagement in ensuring regional peace and security. With an Agreement on Defense Cooperation (2000) and an Agreement on the Supply of Defense Equipment at the turn of the century, the two nations significantly enhanced their defence cooperation (2003). Under the IBSA framework, Indian and South African armed forces enhanced combined military exercises and improved maritime security cooperation as a result of these agreements. In 2015, an Indian defence business agreed to pay a South African corporation USD 80 million for Integrated Defensive Aids Suites (IDAS).

Indian naval ships and sailing vessels visit South Africa on a regular basis. From October 1 to 13, 2018, Indian ships Tarkash and Kolkata visited Cape Town and took part in the 6th India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR). As part of the Navika Sagar Parikrama, INSV Tarini visited Cape Town from March 2 to 14. In March 2019, the South African Army took part in a multinational field training exercise for African nations hosted by the Indian Army in Pune.

Bonds with Egypt:

In 2018, India and Egypt resolved to strengthen their defence and security relations, including increasing counter-terrorism cooperation and conducting joint military exercises. The two countries have discussed increasing their naval cooperation and exploring the possibility of combined defence equipment manufacture.

Bonds with Kenya:

Kenya is a crucial strategic partner for India, and the existence of a sizable Indian diaspora, as well as a shared colonial history and a common interest in the Western Indian Ocean’s security and stability, links them together. In the midst of geopolitical competition by the US, China, Russia, and Japan to increase dominance in Africa. During their Indo-Pacific debate, the two countries not only reviewed the security situation in the Indo-Pacific area and the Horn of Africa, but they also voiced worry over the emergence of terrorism in parts of Africa and Asia. The two countries have agreed to deepen their collaboration in the area to promote peace and security. Kenya must embrace technology and learn how to cope with modern security risks. India can help by promoting modernization, exchanging best practices, and institutional actions in important sectors. Kenya may also use its strong ties with India to promote training in technical breakthroughs that can help address regional security issues.

Bonds with Nigeria:

India, as the world’s greatest democracy, and Nigeria, as the continent’s largest democracy, share the principles of pluralism, inclusion, and long-term development for all. Both nations have been working towards building the momentum into deepening the good connections between two nations and peoples for the mutual benefit of both. Significantly, India is Nigeria’s greatest commercial partner, with a bilateral trade turnover of USD 13.9 billion in 2019-20, and Nigeria is India’s top trading partner in Africa. The partnership has grown to include fresh sectors such as defence equipment support, medical and maintenance services, R&D expertise for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, and frequent information/view exchanges.

India and Africa must deal effectively with the China factor, and Africa in particular must avoid becoming a theatre of rivalry and competition while seeking to safeguard its interests. Both India and Africa must evaluate their collaboration and its impact on the ground, and change their strategies to take their relationship to the next level by including the business sectors in both countries. Given the overlap of interests, 2022 will be a critical year for transforming links into mutually beneficial relationships.

Bonds with Zimbabwe:

India and Zimbabwe have decided to take their bilateral ties to the next level by expanding existing areas of collaboration and establishing new ones. The two countries have condemned terrorism in all of its manifestations, emphasising that no act of terrorism can be justified. In 2018, the presidents of the two countries pledged to work together at the United Nations and other multilateral organisations to combat the threat of terrorism.

Conclusion:

India and Africa must deal effectively with the China factor, and Africa in particular must avoid becoming a theatre of rivalry and competition while seeking to safeguard its interests. Both India and Africa must evaluate their collaboration and its impact on the ground, and change their strategies to take their relationship to the next level by including the business sectors in both countries. Given the overlap of interests, 2022 will be a critical year for transforming links into mutually beneficial relationships.

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