North Korea has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, when paired with its missile and nuclear tests and belligerent rhetoric, has sparked global worry. However, international powers have been powerless to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is unknown in terms of quantity and power. According to experts, Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests and produced ballistic missiles capable of hitting the US and its allies Japan and South Korea. According to varying estimations by specialists, Pyongyang might have between twenty and sixty nuclear warheads constructed. North Korea has enough fissile material—the fundamental component of nuclear bombs—for 65 nuclear warheads, according to US intelligence sources, and it creates enough fissile material for twelve more weapons per year. By 2027, according to a RAND Corporation assessment from 2021, North Korea might have roughly 200 nuclear bombs and hundreds of ballistic missiles. The dictatorship has the know-how to make nuclear bombs out of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, which are the basic ingredients in fissile material. Under previous Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Il, North Korea conducted six nuclear tests, the first in October 2006 and the second in May 2009. The nuclear programme expanded dramatically under Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-son, who took control in late 2011. Kim has ordered four nuclear tests—in February 2013, January and September 2016, and September 2017—as well as over 125 missile launches, significantly more than his father and grandfather, North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung, did.

The destructive potential of North Korea’s nuclear weapons has increased. In 2006, a plutonium-fueled atomic bomb with a yield equal to two kilotons of TNT, an energy unit used to quantify the force of an explosive detonation, exploded for the first time. According to statistics from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonpartisan think tank located in Washington, DC, the 2009 test yielded eight kilotons; the 2013 and January 2016 tests both yielded roughly seventeen kilotons, and the September 2016 test yielded 35 kilotons. Experts think the nuclear test on September 3, 2017, was far bigger, indicating that the country has developed much more potent bomb-making technology. According to estimates based on seismic activity, the explosion was likely more than 200 kilotons. A massive explosion like this lends validity to North Korea’s claims of developing a hydrogen bomb.

North Korea has demonstrated a number of new ballistic missiles since then. The first was an ICBM larger than the Hwasong-15, which was displayed at a military parade in October 2020. Although it hasn’t been labelled or tested, it is believed that it may be equipped with several nuclear warheads or decoys to fool missile defence systems. In October 2020, a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Pukkuksong-4, was unveiled, followed by the Pukkuksong-5 in January 2021. The Pukkuksong-5 is estimated to have a range of roughly 3,000 kilometres (1,864 miles), allowing it to target Guam. Both missiles have not been tested yet, according to experts. Pyongyang tested solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles in 2021, improving a technology that makes rockets simpler to transport and fire. It also tested a highly agile long-range cruise missile, which, when fired in concert with ballistic missiles, may confuse missile defence systems. North Korea tested missiles from a train launcher for the first time in September, making them less detectable by the US and its allies.

North Korea recently test-fired a new type of tactical guided weapon aimed at improving its nuclear-weapons capabilities, only days after it celebrated its most important state anniversary without the usual military parade, which it uses to announce provocative weapons systems. According to the report, the missiles travelled roughly 110 kilometres (68 miles) at a maximum speed of Mach 4, with an apogee of 25 kilometres (16 miles). According to the statement, intelligence agencies in South Korea and the United States are looking into further facts about the launches. The test, Pyongyang’s 13th this year, comes amid fears that Pyongyang would soon undertake a greater provocation, such as a nuclear test, in an effort to enhance the country’s weapons arsenal and boost pressure on its adversaries amid stalled talks. 

Aid from other countries:

Although the nuclear programme is mostly indigenous, it has benefited from outside help throughout time. From the late 1950s through the 1980s, Moscow aided Pyongyang’s nuclear programme by providing missile blueprints, light-water reactors, and some nuclear fuel. China and North Korea worked together on defence in the 1970s, including ballistic missile research and manufacture. In the 1970s, Pakistan also became a significant military ally of North Korea. Bilateral nuclear cooperation began during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), when experts from both nations were in Iran working on ballistic missiles. North Korea had access to Pakistani centrifuge technology and blueprints in the 1990s, according to physicist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who oversaw Pakistan’s nuclear armament. Pyongyang also acquired blueprints for a uranium-enrichment bomb, which Pakistan most likely obtained from China. Pakistan obtained North Korean missile technology in exchange. It’s unclear if Khan acted on behalf of the Pakistani government directly or indirectly. (In addition to Iran and Libya, Khan’s worldwide network traded nuclear technology and material illegally.) North Korea’s nuclear know-how from Pakistan most certainly enabled it to operate centrifuges and develop a uranium-based weapon.

Conclusion:

The underlying philosophical ideas of North Korea have been juche (self-reliance) and songun (unity) (military-first politics). The military plays an important role in politics, and its status has progressively risen during the Kim dynasty. The North Korean leadership is concerned that hostile external forces, like South Korea and the United States, may launch an assault. As a result, Pyongyang believes that developing asymmetric military capabilities to counter its perceived threats is the only way to ensure national existence. Punitive measures implemented against Pyongyang, on the other hand, appear to have merely strengthened Kim’s resolve to build the military. And, while diplomatic engagement has slowed North Korea’s testing pace in the past, it has not resulted in disarmament.

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