Australia’s developing strategic connections with India are defined by defense alliances, people-to-people links, and prospective trade pacts that are being expedited. After five decades of tense or distant strategic relations, India and Australia began to build a more cooperative defense and security collaboration in the early 2000s. Similar worries about China’s ascent, behaviour, and aggressiveness, as well as shared perspectives on the regional strategic situation, were the key causes. Following the mainstreaming of India’s nuclear program, the easing of Australia’s uranium prohibition, and the India–Australia civilian nuclear accord, India’s nuclear status is now a non-issue. Large numbers of Indian visitors, students, and immigrants contribute to Australia’s economy and society, and people-to-people relations have grown.
History:
Prior to Indian independence, the two nations established diplomatic relations during WWII, with the first high commissioners arriving in New Delhi and Canberra in 1944 and 1945, respectively. Despite becoming a republic in 1950, Australia initially backed India’s ambition to remain a member of the Commonwealth. After years of disagreements against the backdrop of the early Cold War, the two countries joined the United States and the United Kingdom in air force exercises, ‘shiksha’ in 1963, and senior officials from both countries met in 1967 for talks, coinciding with the beginning of Australia’s re-engagement with Asia. While there was no complete lack of security cooperation between the two nations throughout the Cold War – an Australian was among the first class of military commanders to be taught at India’s Defense Services Staff College in 1950. Military education for professionals remained a point of engagement. Australia’s Governor-General Sir Peter Cosgrove, who graduated from the National Defense College in New Delhi in 1994, was one of the recipients. Nonetheless, until 2000, the elements that normally identify a beneficial relationship between capable military forces — strategic talks, information sharing, military exercises, training and education, and defense trade and technical cooperation — were conspicuously absent.
The current conditions in which Australia and India now find themselves are inextricably linked to the four historical stumbling blocks. The new geopolitics is the first of these scenarios. While there is no clear consensus on the nature of the post-Cold War international order, there are a few distinct tendencies to be seen. The influence of China’s ascent and behaviour, which has had deep repercussions for both Australia and India, is the most significant. Both India and Australia have raised worries about China’s centralised decision-making, state-led economic policies, territorial revisionism, and erosion of standards, as well as its overall security posture in the Indo–Pacific. As a result, India and Australia have started working on their own and with like-minded allies to compete with China in regions and subjects that are important to their national security interests.
Cooperation between the two countries:
In 2006, strategic relations between Australia and India reached a new high point, coinciding with India’s increased engagement with the US and Japan. Growing fears about China’s ascent, as well as political orientation in the two nations’ leaderships, looked to be driving this. During John Howard’s visit to India in March 2006, an India–Australia defence framework deal — a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation — was signed, along with a slew of other accords relating to the economy, commerce, and technology. Terrorism, defence cooperation, information exchange, and extradition were all highlighted. As a result, bilateral defence interaction accelerated dramatically during the following two years. Australia’s Minister for Defence Brendan Nelson visited India in July 2007, sandwiched between visits by Australia’s Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of Navy, during which he signed an agreement on the protection of classified information. While, Australia also took part in the Malabar naval exercise (Malabar 07–02), in which the US, Japanese, and Singaporean navies had also participated in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the first Quad meeting involving the foreign ministries of India, Australia, the United States, and Japan in Manila, became linked in the public consciousness. Malabar 07–02 was a large-scale operation involving around 25 ships, 150 aircraft, and 20,000 people, including three carrier strike groups from the US and India.
The first trilateral senior official meetings between Australia, India, and Japan took place in New Delhi in June 2015. During the MBC chief’s visit to India in August 2015, a high-level Indian Coastguard meeting including Australia’s Maritime Border Command (MBC) took place. In September 2015, the Bay of Bengal hosted the first significant bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX. All of these developments were followed by the now-standard conversations between the defence and foreign ministries, a senior official dialogue led by the foreign ministry, two-way military leadership visits, and a port call by two Indian navy warships in Fremantle.
Nuclear non-proliferation problems, which had long been a sore point in ties, also took a dramatic turn between 2014 and 2017. During Tony Abbott’s September 2014 visit to India, a civil nuclear energy cooperation deal was reached after three rounds of discussions in mid-2014. In November, more talks took place over the implementation of a uranium selling agreement with India, and the civil nuclear agreement was signed in November 2015. In the two years that followed, Australia supported India’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[31], and bilateral discussions on non-proliferation and disarmament were held in 2016. One of the primary irritants in the strategic partnership has been resolved as a result of these developments.
During the G20 Summit in Osaka following, Scott Morrison’s and Narendra Modi’s re-elections in 2019, big changes had transpired. A virtual summit was conducted in June 2020 after multiple postponements owing to the worldwide coronavirus epidemic, during which they declared a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries. They reached an agreement on a framework for marine cooperation as well as cyber technology collaboration. At the level of foreign secretaries, an India-France-Australia discussion was also launched in September 2020, including three capable resident marine governments in the Indian Ocean. India and Australia also participate in a number of regional and global forums together, with some cooperation. IORA, the G20, and ASEAN-led organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus), and the East Asia Summit are among them (EAS). In 2020, there will be new issue-based groups linking India and Australia, such as 5G telecommunications, artificial intelligence, and supply chain resilience. The governments of India and Australia, as well as Japan, have taken the lead on this subject.
While, a rising number of common platforms, as well as improved chances for collaborative training and interoperability, have benefited the Indian and Australian forces. C-17 strategic transport planes, C-130 tactical planes, P-8 maritime surveillance planes, and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters are among them. The Indian military has also received confidential briefings on prospective future platforms, including airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, from the Australian armed forces.
Conclusion:
The deepening of variable aspects of connections might enhance strategic relationships to some extent. This will naturally extend to interpersonal relationships, especially given Australia’s growing number of Indian immigrants. As a result, there will be more instructional interactions in both directions. Deepening and widening commercial and economic ties in both nations would contribute to the bilateral relationship’s trust, stability, and interest. Although trade does not necessarily follow the flag, in an era of strategic decoupling, any two nations’ commercial and security relationships will become increasingly crucial.