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The defense ministry of the Government of India, on 14th June 2022 announced the change in the Indian military recruitment model and hence announced the ‘Agneepath Scheme’ for stations below the rank of commissioned officers in all three wings of the military. This will be the only recruitment route for the military and all recruits will be hired for a fixed period of four years under a new military rank named ‘Agniveer’.

Central to the scheme, Indian youth is set to play a crucial role in realizing the dream of building an AatmaNirbhar, Sashakt Bharat. And Agnipath scheme will take them a step closer as claimed by the Indian government.

Many countries practice compulsory military conscription methodology to fuel the need of youth in their military resource pool. South Korea, for instance, establishes in its constitution the mandatory conscription of the male population between the ages of 18-35 for a period of 18 months of military service from where they may apply for permanent commission. The Agnipath Scheme although not identical but is similar to such conscription methodology, allows for both male and female aspirants of age group 17.5 to 23 years of age to apply for the military services for a fixed duration and have a prospect of permanent commission after the tenure granted that not more than 25 percent of the total strength of the retiring batch will be selected for the permanent cadre.

Amidst all the skepticism raised regarding the after-effects of this change, Major General Ashok Kumar was of the view that every change raises apprehensions in the beginning. “This scheme is transformational and will benefit both the armed forces and the country in an asymmetrical manner. It will bring down the current age profile of the frontline units from 32 years at present to 26 years in four-six years’ time.  Since the retention will be only 25 percent of the intake there will be a qualitative upgrade of the unit’s profile,” he said.

Army Veteran, Lieutenant General Raj Shukla was also supportive of the Agnipath scheme believing that this scheme was a part of a major National Security makeover. Numerous measures are being taken in procurement, innovation, OFB reforms, DRDO. The Agnipath scheme is a comprehensive reform that has 3 modules – Recruitment, Training, and re-enrollment. This is not just about the armed forces but it is a comprehensive scheme. The present recruitment system has gone obsolete as it is 70 years old where the emphasis is only on physical and medical. It is a modified and greatly improved system. The Agnipath scheme is linked further to ITIs and Skill India so that we get better recruits. And when we get better recruits, and as per the retention policy, we will retain the best of the best. All the candidates will go through focused and Scientific training modules in accordance with the global standards.

Further, Internationally Russia has followed a hybrid model of conscription and contract to recruit soldiers into their Armed Forces. Conscripts have a term of one year and are then put into reserve. As of 2021, all male citizens aged 18–27 are subject to conscription for one year of active duty military service in the Armed Forces. New conscripts undergo up to eight months of training before being sent to designated units. Conscription seasons run twice a year in Russia – from 1 April until 15 July (spring) and between 1 October and 31 December (autumn). During these periods, men aged between 18 and 27, with no health issues or outstanding convictions could be called on to serve. The youth of France join the Armed Forces, called the Forces armées françaises, on a voluntary and contractual basis. The volunteer can sign a one-year contract, which can be extended to five years. Soldiers are given training for three months and those who serve for over 19 years are eligible for the state pension.

Conclusion

There are various contractual conscription processes for military services in many countries around the world but most of these countries have mandatory conscription of the young by law. The Agneepath scheme ensures the voluntary enlistment nature of the Indian military but at the same time provides the benefit of retaining the polished recruits among the many who enter the Agniveer program. Thus, ensuring the quality of the cadets entering the main forces.

A military exercise or war game is a measure to test the performance of the armed forces without engaging on the battlefield. On the intangible side, military exercises promote brotherhood and camaraderie between soldiers and militaries. Besides goodwill, it is a tool for the projection of a nation’s soft power.

In international relations strategy, military diplomacy has, in recent years, emerged as a powerful tool to further the diplomatic interests of nations. Participation in international level military exercises is an indication of the highest level of trust and confidence between the member nations. It is a critical confidence-building measure (CBM) and an expression of the faith reposed by India in another country or a group of member nations.

Military exercises have enabled militaries to understand each other’s drills and procedures, overcome language barriers, and familiarize equipment capabilities. It also facilitates understanding and familiarisation with new technologies that other countries may be utilizing and enables on-the-job training of each other’s crews. This is particularly useful in the event of joint operations, whether in war or in operations other than war (OOTW) – humanitarian aid, disaster relief, anti-piracy, etc. – when nations come together for a common cause. A fine example was the aid assistance provided by a host of nations during the tsunami in South East Asia, where a massive land, air, and sea rescue effort was successfully executed to give relief to the affected countries.

Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, otherwise known as QUAD, have  conducted the second edition of the Malabar naval exercises off the coast of Guam from August 26-29, 2021. This time including the fourth member of the QUAD, i.e., Australia.

According to the Indian Defence ministry, MALABAR-21 witnessed high-tempo exercises conducted between Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes, Submarines, Helicopters, and Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft in the participating navies. Complex surface, sub-surface, and air operations, including Live Weapon Firing Drills, Anti-Surface, Anti-Air, and Anti-Submarine Warfare Drills, Joint Manoeuvres, and Tactical exercises were conducted during this exercise. The 2020 edition of the Malabar exercise, which included Australia, was held in two phases in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.

This was particularly indicative of the increasing hostility between China and the Quad countries, citing to which the cooperation is bound to mature and intensify. The apprehensiveness can be seen in China’s viewpoint, at the growing Quad engagements, and the Malabar exercises in particular, with increasing concern. Beijing has called them the Quad’s efforts at “containing” China’s growing global profile and footprint.

India has different forms of bilateral and multilateral military exercises with all these nations. Recently, the Indian Navy has conducted several Passage Exercises (PASSEX) with the navies of Japan, Australia, and the US. These are basic exercises to increase operability between the navies.

Conclusion

India, as a blooming world power, has to reflect on both the Soft Power Projection and Military Influence over the world and unexplored places. Joint Military Exercises help not only in strengthening diplomatic exchange but also in familiarising the country’s military with unknown geography, making the deployment easy in such terrains if need be. UN Peacekeeping missions are a great example of such practice, as India volunteers for the third-largest peacekeeping efforts.

The United States and Russia have long been at odds, and this has had a direct impact on countries that have links with both of them. India has always been a friend of Russia and has been working hard to strengthen its ties with the United States. The world was shocked recently by Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine in the shape of a conflict. The long-running disputes between the United States and Russia were aggravated. Following multiple sanctions on Russia, the international community rallied around Ukraine. 

What happened when Russia invaded Ukraine?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union had increased sanctions against the country in an effort to isolate it. These were the most recent policies, which are among the most draconian in contemporary history.

Joe Biden, the US president, imposed sanctions on four Russian banks, including V.E.B., as well as corrupt billionaires linked to Putin, in a speech on February 22. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared that all major Russian banks’ assets were frozen and were barred from the UK financial system, as well as it followed by a suspension of several export licences to Russia. It also froze the assets of over 100 other persons and businesses and imposed a deposit restriction for Russian residents in UK bank accounts. Major Russian banks are now excluded from SWIFT, but there will still be restricted access to ensure the ability to pay for gas supplies. Furthermore, the West declared that sanctions to be imposed on the Russian Central Bank, which owns $630 billion in foreign reserves, to prevent it from selling assets in order to mitigate the impact of sanctions. 

The United States implemented export controls, a unique sanction which aimed at limiting Russian access to high-tech components, including hardware and software, manufactured with any parts or intellectual property from the United States. Any individual or firm wishing to export technology, semiconductors, encryption software, lasers, or sensors to Russia had to apply for a licence, which was automatically refused. Sanctions against the individual or firm were employed as part of the enforcement mechanism, with the shipbuilding, aircraft, and defence industries being targeted.

India’s Support for Russia in the UN assembly:

The Russian-Indian relationship has traditionally been cordial. The leaders have terrific chemistry, and residents are friendly to one another. Ordinary Russians consider India as a trustworthy ally with whom their nation enjoys a peaceful relationship. 

The Soviet Union had used its veto multiple times to defend India against Western resolutions on Kashmir, India’s invasion of Goa, and the 1971 war with Pakistan that resulted in Bangladesh’s formation. India, on the other hand, voted no on resolutions denouncing the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan a decade later. It voted against denouncing Russian operations in Chechnya and Abkhazia in the twenty-first century. Behind this is India’s long-standing opposition to Western imperialism – albeit, granted, it should also oppose Russian imperialism to be consistent. India’s decision not to speak at the UN further highlights the fact that Western involvement with India reflects a shift in Western perceptions of India rather than any fundamental transformation within India. During the Cold War, India was widely seen as a nation of spiritualism, yoga, poverty, and curry by Western eyes. Because of its non-alignment, it became reliant on the Soviet Union for armament acquisitions, which continues to this day. 

In recent years, India’s foreign policy has proved that, for the most part, you can have your cake and eat it too by keeping excellent ties with countries that are antagonistic to each other. It has been given a pass when it has interacted with countries with whom the West disagrees, such as Iran. While India’s continuing acquisition of a Russian missile defence system has prompted US sanctions. 

The USA claims to provide aid for India to lessen the country’s dependency on the trade with Russia, more promptly its reliance on weaponry and defence deals with Russia. The two countries, USA and India have been in process of strengthening their relations for the past decade. As part of the Framework on Defence Technology, India and the US have finalised an agreement to create an air-launched unmanned aerial vehicle. India and the United States have committed to increasing defence technology collaboration by pursuing thorough planning and making demonstrable progress on a variety of programmes, in keeping with their fast increasing strategic partnerships. MH-60Rs, P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH[1]64s, CH-47s, and M777 howitzers were among the MH-60Rs, P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH[1]64s, CH-47s, and M777 howitzers that India purchased from the US throughout the years. India may buy further US systems in the future, such as F-21s (former F-16s), F/A-18s, additional P-8s, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (UAVs).

India’s primary concern is internal development. Before India to play the sort of global role that many in the West envision, it will need years of steady economic growth. While its economy is improving, the epidemic had a toll. Based on its own thoughts and reasons, it has built a framework for the country’s future prosperity and foreign policy. With the help of the US, India may be able to get acknowledgement and support for its “great power identity.” There is little question that diplomacy with the United States has always been a priority for India’s foreign policy, and the two nations’ defense ties provide a firm basis for their relationship. According to India, the United States is more than simply the superpower with the most global reach, the most formidable military, and the most advanced economy and technology. It could also help India in areas such as investment, economics and trade, science and technology, military, and diplomacy.

The raging war impetus has got people at the edge of their seats looking at the world giving into the glory of violence. Frequent tension amongst countries over disputes that doesn’t weigh into the collateral damage. Witnessing nations build narratives on who saves who, whilst they speciously try conning one another.

The India-China standoff, the Afghanistan crisis and now the Russian-Ukraine War, have had countries building their military strengths. A high capital expenditure and revenue expenditure being incurred by countries into strong-arming one another, displaying their military strength, deftly gatekeeping their enemies. Studies suggest there is a constant rise in the defence equipment expenditure since the 2000s – the United States, China, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom were the top five spenders in 2020, accounting for approximately 60 per cent of global military spending.  There is a seething increase in defence sourcing. The Indian government recently released its budget, which allocated almost 70% of the defence capital procurement budget to the domestic industry for the years 2022-2023. In addition, private players would be encouraged to develop and improve military platforms to help the Aatmanirbharta campaign and lessen the country’s reliance on imports. 

The rising demand for defence equipment has led to an influx of demand for equipment such as riot control equipment, and body armours. The urgency to protect oneself against the advancing technology and defence sourcing has stirred up the geopolitical front. Countries strategically forming alliances, to cut down the cost of procurement and production has helped them make an evident stand, which has further accelerated the pace of this arms race. India recently signed a $375 million contract with the Philippines for the BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile system, marking the country`s first big defence system export transaction. The supersonic missile with a range of 290 kilometres was developed in collaboration with Russia and is manufactured in India. While Japan and the United States appear to have strengthened their defence relations with two significant defence treaties. The agreement will pave the way for the two countries to collaborate on advanced defence research and development, including a defence system against destructive supersonic missiles. The agreement establishes a new mechanism for the two countries to share the costs of the US military deployment in Japan.

Since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. The Taliban has amassed a considerable amount of weapons that were abandoned on their soil by US forces. The Taliban was rumoured to be providing Pakistan with a large amount of American weaponry taken from the Afghan Army. These hush-hush deals have closely impacted the growth of defence equipment in the South Asian continent. Surrounding countries fear a rise in terrorism. The Indian home ministry suspects a high chance of these weapons being used for violence in Pakistan and neighbouring states suggesting an unjust turmoil against the deeply ingrained communal clashes in the territory. Apart from the unsought threats, India has found itself in a showcase of gallantry against China. India seems to have been building and strengthening their military while China setting up bases in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The Chinese debt-trap strategy has played a vital role in giving way to these military advancements in the debt-ridden countries. Concerns have been raised about China’s loans to Sri Lanka, with fears that the government would be unable to repay them, and that it will use them to undermine India and the United States supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region.   

The Russians invading Ukraine makes people wonder if the world will experience another world war. If I were to give my opinion, the war was inevitable, and so is the arms race that follows. The USA has officially sanctioned $350 Million for Ukraine’s aid for weaponry. Following a wave of the US and other western sanctions against Russian banks and billionaires, intended at punishing Putin and his inner circle for the invasion of Ukraine and hurting the Russian economy, the new help comes as a welcome relief. 

Deviating from the terms of a treaty is an act of war, bringing the treaty to stand null and void. It raises questions, manoeuvring the greys of the circumstances – is humanity collateral damage? Is powering through ranks in terms of strength important to have caused a stir in peace that a treaty held secured? Humanity often gets side-lined in chaos stirred by the wrath that war brings along. 

While on the sidelines, another contest is brewing. China has long claimed Taiwan as its own, intimidates it with its armed forces, and maintains the right to attack it. The recent decision by the US President to send a delegation to Taiwan has given additional validity to fears that China may take action against Taiwan. China’s military, known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is undergoing enormous reforms, and the government is spending more money on defence than it has in the past, bolstering China’s influence in international issues such as the South China Sea. A domino effect has been set in motion for us to see, who’ll come on top. 

Never did we know power has such a hold over our consciousness. Not being content with what one possesses has led to this psychological concept of being on top. The power players lay out strategic plans, to aggravate conditions just to benefit and not think of how the preceding consequences will haunt what is left of humanity. Will the arms race come to an end, or we shall remain unthought for as collateral damage?

Australia’s developing strategic connections with India are defined by defense alliances, people-to-people links, and prospective trade pacts that are being expedited. After five decades of tense or distant strategic relations, India and Australia began to build a more cooperative defense and security collaboration in the early 2000s. Similar worries about China’s ascent, behaviour, and aggressiveness, as well as shared perspectives on the regional strategic situation, were the key causes. Following the mainstreaming of India’s nuclear program, the easing of Australia’s uranium prohibition, and the India–Australia civilian nuclear accord, India’s nuclear status is now a non-issue. Large numbers of Indian visitors, students, and immigrants contribute to Australia’s economy and society, and people-to-people relations have grown.

History:

Prior to Indian independence, the two nations established diplomatic relations during WWII, with the first high commissioners arriving in New Delhi and Canberra in 1944 and 1945, respectively. Despite becoming a republic in 1950, Australia initially backed India’s ambition to remain a member of the Commonwealth. After years of disagreements against the backdrop of the early Cold War, the two countries joined the United States and the United Kingdom in air force exercises, ‘shiksha’ in 1963, and senior officials from both countries met in 1967 for talks, coinciding with the beginning of Australia’s re-engagement with Asia. While there was no complete lack of security cooperation between the two nations throughout the Cold War – an Australian was among the first class of military commanders to be taught at India’s Defense Services Staff College in 1950. Military education for professionals remained a point of engagement. Australia’s Governor-General Sir Peter Cosgrove, who graduated from the National Defense College in New Delhi in 1994, was one of the recipients. Nonetheless, until 2000, the elements that normally identify a beneficial relationship between capable military forces — strategic talks, information sharing, military exercises, training and education, and defense trade and technical cooperation — were conspicuously absent.

The current conditions in which Australia and India now find themselves are inextricably linked to the four historical stumbling blocks. The new geopolitics is the first of these scenarios. While there is no clear consensus on the nature of the post-Cold War international order, there are a few distinct tendencies to be seen. The influence of China’s ascent and behaviour, which has had deep repercussions for both Australia and India, is the most significant. Both India and Australia have raised worries about China’s centralised decision-making, state-led economic policies, territorial revisionism, and erosion of standards, as well as its overall security posture in the Indo–Pacific. As a result, India and Australia have started working on their own and with like-minded allies to compete with China in regions and subjects that are important to their national security interests.

Cooperation between the two countries:

In 2006, strategic relations between Australia and India reached a new high point, coinciding with India’s increased engagement with the US and Japan. Growing fears about China’s ascent, as well as political orientation in the two nations’ leaderships, looked to be driving this. During John Howard’s visit to India in March 2006, an India–Australia defence framework deal — a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation — was signed, along with a slew of other accords relating to the economy, commerce, and technology. Terrorism, defence cooperation, information exchange, and extradition were all highlighted. As a result, bilateral defence interaction accelerated dramatically during the following two years. Australia’s Minister for Defence Brendan Nelson visited India in July 2007, sandwiched between visits by Australia’s Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of Navy, during which he signed an agreement on the protection of classified information.  While, Australia also took part in the Malabar naval exercise (Malabar 07–02), in which the US, Japanese, and Singaporean navies had also participated in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the first Quad meeting involving the foreign ministries of India, Australia, the United States, and Japan in Manila, became linked in the public consciousness. Malabar 07–02 was a large-scale operation involving around 25 ships, 150 aircraft, and 20,000 people, including three carrier strike groups from the US and India.

The first trilateral senior official meetings between Australia, India, and Japan took place in New Delhi in June 2015. During the MBC chief’s visit to India in August 2015, a high-level Indian Coastguard meeting including Australia’s Maritime Border Command (MBC) took place. In September 2015, the Bay of Bengal hosted the first significant bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX. All of these developments were followed by the now-standard conversations between the defence and foreign ministries, a senior official dialogue led by the foreign ministry, two-way military leadership visits, and a port call by two Indian navy warships in Fremantle.

Nuclear non-proliferation problems, which had long been a sore point in ties, also took a dramatic turn between 2014 and 2017. During Tony Abbott’s September 2014 visit to India, a civil nuclear energy cooperation deal was reached after three rounds of discussions in mid-2014. In November, more talks took place over the implementation of a uranium selling agreement with India, and the civil nuclear agreement was signed in November 2015. In the two years that followed, Australia supported India’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[31], and bilateral discussions on non-proliferation and disarmament were held in 2016. One of the primary irritants in the strategic partnership has been resolved as a result of these developments.

During the G20 Summit in Osaka following, Scott Morrison’s and Narendra Modi’s re-elections in 2019, big changes had transpired. A virtual summit was conducted in June 2020 after multiple postponements owing to the worldwide coronavirus epidemic, during which they declared a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries. They reached an agreement on a framework for marine cooperation as well as cyber technology collaboration. At the level of foreign secretaries, an India-France-Australia discussion was also launched in September 2020, including three capable resident marine governments in the Indian Ocean. India and Australia also participate in a number of regional and global forums together, with some cooperation. IORA, the G20, and ASEAN-led organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus), and the East Asia Summit are among them (EAS). In 2020, there will be new issue-based groups linking India and Australia, such as 5G telecommunications, artificial intelligence, and supply chain resilience. The governments of India and Australia, as well as Japan, have taken the lead on this subject.

While, a rising number of common platforms, as well as improved chances for collaborative training and interoperability, have benefited the Indian and Australian forces. C-17 strategic transport planes, C-130 tactical planes, P-8 maritime surveillance planes, and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters are among them. The Indian military has also received confidential briefings on prospective future platforms, including airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, from the Australian armed forces.

Conclusion:

The deepening of variable aspects of connections might enhance strategic relationships to some extent. This will naturally extend to interpersonal relationships, especially given Australia’s growing number of Indian immigrants. As a result, there will be more instructional interactions in both directions. Deepening and widening commercial and economic ties in both nations would contribute to the bilateral relationship’s trust, stability, and interest. Although trade does not necessarily follow the flag, in an era of strategic decoupling, any two nations’ commercial and security relationships will become increasingly crucial.

Introduction:

In 1992, India and Israel established full diplomatic ties, and the two nations’ bilateral relationship has since bloomed on economic, military, agricultural, and political levels. Both nations perceive themselves as isolated democracies endangered by neighbors that train, finance, and promote terrorism, hence their cooperative relationship is viewed as a strategic requirement by both. The relations were not always cordial. Despite the fact that both countries gained independence from the United Kingdom within months of each other, they have been heading in opposite directions for nearly four decades – India as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement with close ties to the Arab world and the Soviet Union, and Israel with close ties to the United States and Western Europe.    

Both countries have reaped enormous benefits since establishing diplomatic ties. India has become one of Israel’s most important commercial partners, and many of the world’s best high-tech businesses are forming joint ventures in Israel and India that are effectively competing in the global market. Security-related transactions and help in sectors like agriculture and water desalination are now the mainstays of trade and collaboration between the two countries. The key to developing India-Israel ties, though, is security and defense cooperation. The Indian army announced its desire to execute a modernization program in the early 2000s, allocating tens of billions of dollars to the project. Since then, defense sales with Israel have increased at an exponential rate, and India is now Israel’s top export destination.

To give you an idea of how much commerce between Israel and India has grown, overall trade between the two countries was $200 million in 1992 and $4.13 billion in 2016. Without diamonds, Israel shipped $1.15 billion worth of commodities to India in 2016, accounting for 2.5 per cent of the country’s overall exports.

During Modi’s visit to the US in 2017, the two nations inked a number of collaboration agreements. The Israel Space Agency and the Indian Space Research Organization have signed a memorandum of understanding to promote collaboration in the development of electric propulsion systems for tiny satellites and the development of equipment to precisely monitor the severe conditions of space. Officials from Israel and India have signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the India-Israel Innovation Initiative Fund (I4F). Over a five-year period, each of the two countries has pledged $4 million to I4F. Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries are among the Indian companies that inked eight trade agreements with Israeli enterprises. During Modi’s trip to Israel, the Asher Space Research Institute at the Technion and the Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology inked a collaboration agreement. The goal of this agreement is to set up cooperative study and research initiatives.

The defence front:

In July 2020, both nations inked a cyber security pact in the age of fast digitalisation and increased exposure to the risks of the virtual world. As a first step, India and Israel are working together to establish secure systems and services to defend their civilian and strategic assets from ever-increasing cyber-attacks. It’s a key sign of the Indian government’s faith in Tel Aviv to collaborate on defensive technologies as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative. 

The Indian Air Force recently introduced a medium-range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) system capable of destroying aerial threats such as enemy fighter planes, missiles, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The MRSAM, or Barak 8 air defence system, was developed jointly by India and Israel and comprises modern radar, command and control systems, and mobile launchers. For maximum manoeuvrability in the terminal phase, the missile is propelled by a locally built rocket motor and control system.

Israel Aerospace Industries and the Defense Research and Development Organization collaborated to create the system (DRDO). Rafael, Bharat Electronics Limited, Bharat Dynamics Limited, and Larsen & Toubro are among the other companies collaborating on the project.

Over the previous four years, India and Israel have signed separate deals totalling roughly $3 billion for upgraded surface-to-air missile systems for the three services. Last year, India was compelled to speed up the procurement of military gear from various nations, including Israel, due to the continuous border confrontation with China in Ladakh, authorities claimed. As a result of a 2017 order worth $2 billion for advanced systems to take down hostile aircraft and missiles, India is sourcing Firefly loitering ammunition, Spike anti-tank guided missiles, Spice guidance kits that can be mounted on standard bombs to convert them into smart weapons, and an operational surface-to-air missile system from Israel.

Conclusion:

Even while the three-decade-old India–Israel defence alliance is expected to deepen and solidify in the coming years, India’s quest for defence self-reliance will have an influence on the relationship’s size. India has significant modernization demands, as well as the need to adequately address rising security concerns on both the internal and foreign fronts. For India’s security strategists, the all-encompassing Pakistan–China defence cooperation, which provides Islamabad with advanced weaponry and platforms, is just too significant to ignore. India’s defence partnership with Israel is also being looked at as a way to boost the country’s defence exports. BEL, for example, has indicated interest in forming a partnership with the IAI in order to increase the DPSU’s export profile. HAL partnered with IAI to market the Advanced Light Helicopter back in 2003. (ALH). It’ll be interesting to watch how BEL and the IAI go forward with this. The IAI has a well-established worldwide profile and marketing skills, which may be studied and learned from by Indian DPSUs and private sector enterprises.

A greater range of non-traditional fields, such as information and cybersecurity, water conservation, education, health, and research, are supporting ‘India-Israel 2.0.’ The strategic partnership’s elevation of connections aims to strengthen this nascent collaboration in new areas. PM Modi’s tricennial commemoration address echoed this attitude, with equal emphasis on developing geopolitics and mutual prospects. The fresh strategy will help individuals on both ends while also increasing and bolstering government trust.

With the signing of the 2030 Roadmap for India-UK Ties, which sets goals for the partnership over the next 10 years, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a crucial step forward for the future of India-UK relations. The UK government stated that it has begun preparations for a trade deal between the UK and India. The UK government has been hopeful that the consultation would yield additional information that will help guarantee that the deal is representative and that cooperation in future-oriented industries is secure. Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is a longtime proponent of strong India-UK ties and a self-professed Indophile. The strategic importance of this economic partnership for the United Kingdom, which is based on strong cultural and diplomatic ties, had been highlighted in the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy, and will become even more so as the UK embarks on its proposed ‘Indo-Pacific tilt.’ The UK government had asked Prime Minister Modi to attend the G7 conference at Carbis Bay, in recognition of India’s critical security role in the area in the face of a growing China. 

The Roadmap is the first since the formal ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ agreement in 2005, and hopes for its ability to significantly enhance the partnership are divided. Recognizing the need to rectify the bilateral relationship’s falling importance – India has moved from being the UK’s second-largest trade partner in the late 1990s to 17th in 2019 – the UK Government hopes to restart this initiative with renewed vigour as part of its Global Britain strategy. The two countries aim to work together to combat cyber, space, criminal, and terrorist threats, with the goal of creating a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region that maximises democratic participation and economic opportunity while fending off dangers presented by a growing China and now Russia. Because these are areas of competence for both countries, the UK and India will focus on research, innovation, and technology to build new capabilities in the defence and security realms. With long-running border issues with China in Eastern Ladakh, India is gradually recognising the value of increased defence and security cooperation with the UK, US, and EU, and the “roadmap” agreement is a significant first step in that direction. 

The Quad, a security alliance involving the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, had convened digitally for the first time during their first formal meeting. Following the summit, the Quad had vowed to work together on telecommunications, especially to expand and diversify 5G supply chains in order to counter China’s dominance. Despite the fact that the alliance did not specifically reference China, all four nations have banned Huawei’s 5G technology, acknowledging rising concerns and a shifting security paradigm. Increased defence cooperation between the UK and India will be crucial to the UK’s success in the Indo-Pacific area, and the deteriorating ties between India and China give a fresh chance to do so. 

Current Scenario:

Following a summit in New Delhi, recently, Britain and India have inked a new defence cooperation pact and  finalised a free trade agreement, which shall be implemented by the end of the year. The arrangement relies on an open general export licence for India to reduce delivery times for guns and other defence equipment. At the moment, only the European Union and the United States have such permits. According to the British High Commission, part of the British offer includes “next-generation” defence and security collaboration spanning land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The agreement, according to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, would assist New Delhi shift away from its reliance on Russia by boosting economic and defence relations with the West, including British backing for India’s domestic weapon manufacture.

The leaders have emphasised on the importance of strong defence industrial collaboration for manufacturing defence equipment, systems, spare parts, components, aggregates, and other related products and key capabilities under the Make-in-India programme, which includes co-development, indigenization, technology transfer, and the formation of joint ventures to meet the needs of India’s and other countries’ armed forces. They mentioned cooperation in important vital sectors including modern fighter aircraft and advanced core technology for jet engines. Both parties committed to collaborate bilaterally and with important partner nations to ensure Indian business had the best possible access to technology. Prime Minister Modi appreciated the United Kingdom’s offer of a ‘open general export licence’ to enable technical collaboration with India, as well as India’s open participation in the UK’s aviation and navy shipbuilding programmes.

Both nations have expressed zero tolerance for terrorism in all its forms – and for all those who encourage, support and finance terrorism or provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups – whatever their motivation may be. They have called upon all countries to work together to root out terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupt terrorist networks and their financing channels, and halt cross-border movement of terrorists. The condemnation was reiterated for the terrorist attacks in India and the UK, including the Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. The importance of perpetrators of terrorist attacks being systematically and expeditiously brought to justice, and agreeing to work together to take concerted action against globally proscribed terrorist entities and individuals, is being emphasised by the two nations. The gratitude for the continuous collaboration through the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (JWG-CT) is tremendous, particularly in terms of exchanging information and intelligence on terror organisations and persons. The two nations have agreed to form a counter-extremism sub-group within this framework in order to strengthen cooperation between the two sides in ensuring that all possible actions are taken against groups and individuals based in or operating out of either country who seek to incite violent extremism and terrorism, as well as those involved in financing such activities.

Conclusion:

The India-UK defence partnership will no longer be restricted to a buyer-seller relationship in the future. It will not, however, be limited to defence manufacturing. The two nations have the capacity to establish a genuinely comprehensive strategic relationship in action via close maritime cooperation and a coordinated approach to ensuring regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

All revenue and capital expenditure on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces of defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects, and paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped, and ready for military operations, is referred to as defence expenditure. It typically reflects a country’s perception of the possibility of threats against it, as well as the level of aggressiveness it desires to use. It also provides an estimate of how much funding should be allocated for the future year. A budget’s size also reflects an organization’s capacity to support military actions. The size of that entity’s economy, other financial pressures on that entity, and the government’s or people’s willingness to pay such military activities are among the factors.

  • Capital expenditure refers to the money spent by the government on the development of machinery, equipment, buildings, health facilities, education, and other similar projects. It also includes the price of acquiring long-term assets like land and defence equipment, as well as government investments that will generate future revenues or dividends. These expenses result in the creation of assets, which allow the economy to produce income by expanding and improving production facilities and improving operational efficiency. It also improves labour participation, examines the economy, and boosts the economy’s future ability to create more.
  • Revenue expenditure refers to the portion of government spending that does not result in the creation of assets; such expenditures are spent to fulfil the government’s running needs. Salaries, salaries, pensions, subsidies, and interest are all examples of revenue expenditures. 

According to new figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, total worldwide military expenditure grew to $1981 billion in 2020, up 2.6 per cent in real terms from 2019. (SIPRI). The United States, China, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom were the top five spenders in 2020, accounting for 62 per cent of worldwide military spending. 

India’s budget allocation has continually increased over time. Between 2011-12 and 2020-21, defense spending climbed by 127 per cent. The distribution of this allocation between revenue and capital spending, on the other hand, is skewed, with revenue expenditure expanding faster than capital expenditure. The key driver of greater revenue expenditure growth is increased spending on defense pensions. To achieve India’s new set aim, ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat,’ the country’s drive toward an enduring indigenous defense manufacturing industry, as well as to build a strong upholding for the new system, more revenue spending will be required. India is also one of the world’s largest importers of military equipment. The nation has aimed to bolster the expenditure by increasing private sector involvement in defense production and research and development. Manufacturing still is moving slowly, but research and development is gaining traction. India’s total defense budget has increased at a rate of 9% per year over the last 10 years. 

Between 2011-12 and 2018-19, defence revenue spending increased by 140 per cent, while capital expenditure increased by 101 per cent. During the same time period, the percentage of the total defence budget spent on pensions increased from 18 per cent to 26 per cent.

Furthermore, China’s, regional expenditure growth slowed in 2020 as countries like Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia lowered their defence budgets in order to finance emergency relief efforts in the aftermath of the outbreak. The majority of the time, expected growth was slashed rather than actual cutbacks to the previous year’s budget. Asia’s defence expenditure growth slowed to 4.3 per cent in 2020, down from 4.6 per cent in 2019, as a result of the slowdown in China and the rest of the region. Despite this, the region’s share of global defence spending is expected to rise to 25.0 per cent in 2020, from 17.8 per cent in 2010 and 23.2 per cent in 2015. Despite increased investment in Europe, this is expected to remain relatively flat in 2021. 

While in real terms, total European defence spending had increased by 2.0 per cent in 2020. This was a relatively smaller increase than the 4.1 per cent increase witnessed in 2019, and Europe’s proportion of global defence spending declined somewhat in 2020, from 17.8% to 17.5 per cent. However, over the previous years, average spending across European NATO members has gradually climbed as a percentage of GDP, rising from 1.25 per cent in 2014 to 1.52 per cent in 2019 and rising further to 1.64 per cent in 2020. This is still well below the NATO recommendation that its members aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence, despite the significant 7.0% average economic contraction expected in 2020. When it comes to spending on defence equipment, NATO’s European members maintained the higher investment share of defence spending that they achieved in 2019, allocating 23% on average in 2020, beyond the NATO-recommended level of 20%.

The defence expenditures in the Middle East and North Africa have declined, falling to US$150 billion (excluding security expenditure), while the percentage of global defence spending fell to 8.9%, down from 10.5 per cent in 2017. Despite dedicating by far the highest share of economic production to defence, at 5.2 per cent of GDP, compared to the world average of 2.08 per cent, the area continues to struggle. Other oil-dependent economies began to feel the pinch as well. Following a significant 3.8 per cent real rise in the core ‘national defence’ budget in 2020, Russia was only able to execute a minuscule 1.4 per cent increase in 2021, resulting in a 3.6 per cent real reduction. Total Russian military spending (which includes pensions, military housing, and health and social assistance) is expected to drop from over 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2020 to under 3.8 percent in 2023.

Conclusion:

Peace is important to maintain fruitful trade relations in a given region. However, this peace can only be achieved if military spending is done. Military spending builds military might. This power acts as a deterrent for aggressors. In the absence of military spending, opponents may view the nation as a soft target. Hence, even though local defense spending may be more expensive, it creates more value in the form of more robust national security and fewer disruptions to trade and commerce. If the defense system of a country is fully integrated, there are economic benefits to it. Defense expenditure is, without a doubt, an unambiguous demonstration of power, as current patterns of growing defense spending shows.

Russian-Indian ties have always been amicable. The leaders’ chemistry is great, and citizens feel cordial toward one another. Ordinary Russians regard India as a dependable friend with whom their own country has a trouble-free relationship. For their part, most Indians see Russia as a trusted ally who has never harmed India’s strategic interests in its seventy-five years of independence.

During the Soviet era, India and Russia had decades of strong ties at the highest levels. The morality of India and the Soviet Union were not imposed on one another. When the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, India, which was eager to speak out the flaws and injustices of Western imperialism, kept quiet. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, more than made up for India’s relative calm. It backed India in the dispute over Kashmir, which India and Pakistan have fought over since 1947. Russian economic and military help to India was matched by political backing for India at the United Nations Security Council on the Kashmir problem, when Pakistan, backed by the US and the UK, advocated acting to resolve the conflict.  Despite their friendship, Russia attempted to constrain Mao Zedong and his colleagues during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Following this disaster, Russia increased its weaponry and technical aid to India. However, as the newly constituted Russian Federation strove to reestablish its foreign policy, the turbulence of the first post-Soviet years echoed across the Indo-Russian relationship as well. 

The Boris Yeltsin government had a pro-Western foreign policy stance in the years after the demise of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, India was approaching the point when it needed to liberalise its economy and seek to the West for trade and investment. While a result, both countries were consumed with internal concerns as they transitioned to a new international order. 

The two nations signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1993, and a year later, a Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement. Following a brief time from 1990 to 1993, India became a prominent importer of Russian weaponry, resulting in a steep drop in the amount of arms shipments. Russia’s defence exports to India and China then accounted for 41% of the country’s overall earnings. It was crucial for the survival of Russia’s armaments sector, which suffered as a result of lower orders from its own military following the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and Russia signed $650 million worth of weapons deals in 1992. Since then, the relationship has grown into cooperative research, design, development, and manufacture of state-of-the-art military systems from a strictly buyer-seller partnership. Both countries are presently active in the development of indigenous tanks and fighter planes, as well as the modernization of existing defence equipment.

In 2017, within the yearly INDRA framework, the first-ever TriServices exercise was undertaken, and India became a full member of the SCO, resulting in positive improvements in the alliance. INDRA was once a single-service exercise, but that had changed into all three services — army, navy, and air force — are participating. This development was triggered by the cancellation of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft and India’s departure from the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft programme, which began in 2007. India chose to terminate the latter project after 11 years of stagnation on issues such as cost-sharing and technology. 

The 21st India-Russia annual summit is significant, especially with the arrival in India of the long-range S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system. Putin’s visit drew a considerable interest; it was his second trip overseas since the COVID-19 outbreak began, following a conference with US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June. The importance of the bilateral relationship as a special and privileged strategic partnership has been emphasised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The conference resulted in the signing of a 10-year defence technological cooperation pact, as well as a $600 million deal for the Indo-Russian joint venture to produce over 600,000 AK-203 Kalashnikov rifles in India. In addition, both nations have set a lofty target of increasing bilateral trade to $30 billion by 2025. The conference resulted in the signing of 28 agreements in total. 

Notwithstanding deepening of the relations with the U.S. over the last two decades, India still appears to lack trust in its strategic relations with the States. The country also has apprehensions about Russia’s close defense and strategic proximity with China. Against this backdrop, India is likely to engage both powers simultaneously to counterbalance China while retaining its strategic autonomy. The underlying notions of that of the Quad’s strategic footprint will also expand, especially as China’s tendrils reach throughout the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, the more active China becomes in its border conflict with India, the more likely India is to rely on the Quad. As a result, Russia will need to be more attentive to India’s worries about China’s territorial ambitions. India faces a difficult task in striking the correct balance between Russia and the Quad. This moreover indicates that without entering into close alignment with either the U.S. or Russia, India would engage both as per its security and strategic requirements. In the long term, India appears to have its own ambition of becoming a big power; thus aligning with either the U.S. or Russia may hamper its goals.

Neither India nor Russia, for that matter, wish to be China’s or the US’s vassal state. And one way they may endeavour to avert that conclusion is to remind China, the US, and the rest of the globe that they can rely on each other for support. Following recent tensions with China, India may wish to increase its reliance on the United States. But, if history repeats itself and the present is any clue, it will maintain its connections with Russia.