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India’s strategic relations with Australia.

Australia’s developing strategic connections with India are defined by defense alliances, people-to-people links, and prospective trade pacts that are being expedited. After five decades of tense or distant strategic relations, India and Australia began to build a more cooperative defense and security collaboration in the early 2000s. Similar worries about China’s ascent, behaviour, and aggressiveness, as well as shared perspectives on the regional strategic situation, were the key causes. Following the mainstreaming of India’s nuclear program, the easing of Australia’s uranium prohibition, and the India–Australia civilian nuclear accord, India’s nuclear status is now a non-issue. Large numbers of Indian visitors, students, and immigrants contribute to Australia’s economy and society, and people-to-people relations have grown.

History:

Prior to Indian independence, the two nations established diplomatic relations during WWII, with the first high commissioners arriving in New Delhi and Canberra in 1944 and 1945, respectively. Despite becoming a republic in 1950, Australia initially backed India’s ambition to remain a member of the Commonwealth. After years of disagreements against the backdrop of the early Cold War, the two countries joined the United States and the United Kingdom in air force exercises, ‘shiksha’ in 1963, and senior officials from both countries met in 1967 for talks, coinciding with the beginning of Australia’s re-engagement with Asia. While there was no complete lack of security cooperation between the two nations throughout the Cold War – an Australian was among the first class of military commanders to be taught at India’s Defense Services Staff College in 1950. Military education for professionals remained a point of engagement. Australia’s Governor-General Sir Peter Cosgrove, who graduated from the National Defense College in New Delhi in 1994, was one of the recipients. Nonetheless, until 2000, the elements that normally identify a beneficial relationship between capable military forces — strategic talks, information sharing, military exercises, training and education, and defense trade and technical cooperation — were conspicuously absent.

The current conditions in which Australia and India now find themselves are inextricably linked to the four historical stumbling blocks. The new geopolitics is the first of these scenarios. While there is no clear consensus on the nature of the post-Cold War international order, there are a few distinct tendencies to be seen. The influence of China’s ascent and behaviour, which has had deep repercussions for both Australia and India, is the most significant. Both India and Australia have raised worries about China’s centralised decision-making, state-led economic policies, territorial revisionism, and erosion of standards, as well as its overall security posture in the Indo–Pacific. As a result, India and Australia have started working on their own and with like-minded allies to compete with China in regions and subjects that are important to their national security interests.

Cooperation between the two countries:

In 2006, strategic relations between Australia and India reached a new high point, coinciding with India’s increased engagement with the US and Japan. Growing fears about China’s ascent, as well as political orientation in the two nations’ leaderships, looked to be driving this. During John Howard’s visit to India in March 2006, an India–Australia defence framework deal — a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation — was signed, along with a slew of other accords relating to the economy, commerce, and technology. Terrorism, defence cooperation, information exchange, and extradition were all highlighted. As a result, bilateral defence interaction accelerated dramatically during the following two years. Australia’s Minister for Defence Brendan Nelson visited India in July 2007, sandwiched between visits by Australia’s Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of Navy, during which he signed an agreement on the protection of classified information.  While, Australia also took part in the Malabar naval exercise (Malabar 07–02), in which the US, Japanese, and Singaporean navies had also participated in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the first Quad meeting involving the foreign ministries of India, Australia, the United States, and Japan in Manila, became linked in the public consciousness. Malabar 07–02 was a large-scale operation involving around 25 ships, 150 aircraft, and 20,000 people, including three carrier strike groups from the US and India.

The first trilateral senior official meetings between Australia, India, and Japan took place in New Delhi in June 2015. During the MBC chief’s visit to India in August 2015, a high-level Indian Coastguard meeting including Australia’s Maritime Border Command (MBC) took place. In September 2015, the Bay of Bengal hosted the first significant bilateral naval exercise AUSINDEX. All of these developments were followed by the now-standard conversations between the defence and foreign ministries, a senior official dialogue led by the foreign ministry, two-way military leadership visits, and a port call by two Indian navy warships in Fremantle.

Nuclear non-proliferation problems, which had long been a sore point in ties, also took a dramatic turn between 2014 and 2017. During Tony Abbott’s September 2014 visit to India, a civil nuclear energy cooperation deal was reached after three rounds of discussions in mid-2014. In November, more talks took place over the implementation of a uranium selling agreement with India, and the civil nuclear agreement was signed in November 2015. In the two years that followed, Australia supported India’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[31], and bilateral discussions on non-proliferation and disarmament were held in 2016. One of the primary irritants in the strategic partnership has been resolved as a result of these developments.

During the G20 Summit in Osaka following, Scott Morrison’s and Narendra Modi’s re-elections in 2019, big changes had transpired. A virtual summit was conducted in June 2020 after multiple postponements owing to the worldwide coronavirus epidemic, during which they declared a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries. They reached an agreement on a framework for marine cooperation as well as cyber technology collaboration. At the level of foreign secretaries, an India-France-Australia discussion was also launched in September 2020, including three capable resident marine governments in the Indian Ocean. India and Australia also participate in a number of regional and global forums together, with some cooperation. IORA, the G20, and ASEAN-led organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus), and the East Asia Summit are among them (EAS). In 2020, there will be new issue-based groups linking India and Australia, such as 5G telecommunications, artificial intelligence, and supply chain resilience. The governments of India and Australia, as well as Japan, have taken the lead on this subject.

While, a rising number of common platforms, as well as improved chances for collaborative training and interoperability, have benefited the Indian and Australian forces. C-17 strategic transport planes, C-130 tactical planes, P-8 maritime surveillance planes, and Chinook heavy-lift helicopters are among them. The Indian military has also received confidential briefings on prospective future platforms, including airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, from the Australian armed forces.

Conclusion:

The deepening of variable aspects of connections might enhance strategic relationships to some extent. This will naturally extend to interpersonal relationships, especially given Australia’s growing number of Indian immigrants. As a result, there will be more instructional interactions in both directions. Deepening and widening commercial and economic ties in both nations would contribute to the bilateral relationship’s trust, stability, and interest. Although trade does not necessarily follow the flag, in an era of strategic decoupling, any two nations’ commercial and security relationships will become increasingly crucial.

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India deepening its ties with Israel.

Introduction:

In 1992, India and Israel established full diplomatic ties, and the two nations’ bilateral relationship has since bloomed on economic, military, agricultural, and political levels. Both nations perceive themselves as isolated democracies endangered by neighbors that train, finance, and promote terrorism, hence their cooperative relationship is viewed as a strategic requirement by both. The relations were not always cordial. Despite the fact that both countries gained independence from the United Kingdom within months of each other, they have been heading in opposite directions for nearly four decades – India as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement with close ties to the Arab world and the Soviet Union, and Israel with close ties to the United States and Western Europe.    

Both countries have reaped enormous benefits since establishing diplomatic ties. India has become one of Israel’s most important commercial partners, and many of the world’s best high-tech businesses are forming joint ventures in Israel and India that are effectively competing in the global market. Security-related transactions and help in sectors like agriculture and water desalination are now the mainstays of trade and collaboration between the two countries. The key to developing India-Israel ties, though, is security and defense cooperation. The Indian army announced its desire to execute a modernization program in the early 2000s, allocating tens of billions of dollars to the project. Since then, defense sales with Israel have increased at an exponential rate, and India is now Israel’s top export destination.

To give you an idea of how much commerce between Israel and India has grown, overall trade between the two countries was $200 million in 1992 and $4.13 billion in 2016. Without diamonds, Israel shipped $1.15 billion worth of commodities to India in 2016, accounting for 2.5 per cent of the country’s overall exports.

During Modi’s visit to the US in 2017, the two nations inked a number of collaboration agreements. The Israel Space Agency and the Indian Space Research Organization have signed a memorandum of understanding to promote collaboration in the development of electric propulsion systems for tiny satellites and the development of equipment to precisely monitor the severe conditions of space. Officials from Israel and India have signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the India-Israel Innovation Initiative Fund (I4F). Over a five-year period, each of the two countries has pledged $4 million to I4F. Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries are among the Indian companies that inked eight trade agreements with Israeli enterprises. During Modi’s trip to Israel, the Asher Space Research Institute at the Technion and the Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology inked a collaboration agreement. The goal of this agreement is to set up cooperative study and research initiatives.

The defence front:

In July 2020, both nations inked a cyber security pact in the age of fast digitalisation and increased exposure to the risks of the virtual world. As a first step, India and Israel are working together to establish secure systems and services to defend their civilian and strategic assets from ever-increasing cyber-attacks. It’s a key sign of the Indian government’s faith in Tel Aviv to collaborate on defensive technologies as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative. 

The Indian Air Force recently introduced a medium-range surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) system capable of destroying aerial threats such as enemy fighter planes, missiles, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The MRSAM, or Barak 8 air defence system, was developed jointly by India and Israel and comprises modern radar, command and control systems, and mobile launchers. For maximum manoeuvrability in the terminal phase, the missile is propelled by a locally built rocket motor and control system.

Israel Aerospace Industries and the Defense Research and Development Organization collaborated to create the system (DRDO). Rafael, Bharat Electronics Limited, Bharat Dynamics Limited, and Larsen & Toubro are among the other companies collaborating on the project.

Over the previous four years, India and Israel have signed separate deals totalling roughly $3 billion for upgraded surface-to-air missile systems for the three services. Last year, India was compelled to speed up the procurement of military gear from various nations, including Israel, due to the continuous border confrontation with China in Ladakh, authorities claimed. As a result of a 2017 order worth $2 billion for advanced systems to take down hostile aircraft and missiles, India is sourcing Firefly loitering ammunition, Spike anti-tank guided missiles, Spice guidance kits that can be mounted on standard bombs to convert them into smart weapons, and an operational surface-to-air missile system from Israel.

Conclusion:

Even while the three-decade-old India–Israel defence alliance is expected to deepen and solidify in the coming years, India’s quest for defence self-reliance will have an influence on the relationship’s size. India has significant modernization demands, as well as the need to adequately address rising security concerns on both the internal and foreign fronts. For India’s security strategists, the all-encompassing Pakistan–China defence cooperation, which provides Islamabad with advanced weaponry and platforms, is just too significant to ignore. India’s defence partnership with Israel is also being looked at as a way to boost the country’s defence exports. BEL, for example, has indicated interest in forming a partnership with the IAI in order to increase the DPSU’s export profile. HAL partnered with IAI to market the Advanced Light Helicopter back in 2003. (ALH). It’ll be interesting to watch how BEL and the IAI go forward with this. The IAI has a well-established worldwide profile and marketing skills, which may be studied and learned from by Indian DPSUs and private sector enterprises.

A greater range of non-traditional fields, such as information and cybersecurity, water conservation, education, health, and research, are supporting ‘India-Israel 2.0.’ The strategic partnership’s elevation of connections aims to strengthen this nascent collaboration in new areas. PM Modi’s tricennial commemoration address echoed this attitude, with equal emphasis on developing geopolitics and mutual prospects. The fresh strategy will help individuals on both ends while also increasing and bolstering government trust.

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India & UK aim to strengthen their defense ties.

With the signing of the 2030 Roadmap for India-UK Ties, which sets goals for the partnership over the next 10 years, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a crucial step forward for the future of India-UK relations. The UK government stated that it has begun preparations for a trade deal between the UK and India. The UK government has been hopeful that the consultation would yield additional information that will help guarantee that the deal is representative and that cooperation in future-oriented industries is secure. Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is a longtime proponent of strong India-UK ties and a self-professed Indophile. The strategic importance of this economic partnership for the United Kingdom, which is based on strong cultural and diplomatic ties, had been highlighted in the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy, and will become even more so as the UK embarks on its proposed ‘Indo-Pacific tilt.’ The UK government had asked Prime Minister Modi to attend the G7 conference at Carbis Bay, in recognition of India’s critical security role in the area in the face of a growing China. 

The Roadmap is the first since the formal ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ agreement in 2005, and hopes for its ability to significantly enhance the partnership are divided. Recognizing the need to rectify the bilateral relationship’s falling importance – India has moved from being the UK’s second-largest trade partner in the late 1990s to 17th in 2019 – the UK Government hopes to restart this initiative with renewed vigour as part of its Global Britain strategy. The two countries aim to work together to combat cyber, space, criminal, and terrorist threats, with the goal of creating a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region that maximises democratic participation and economic opportunity while fending off dangers presented by a growing China and now Russia. Because these are areas of competence for both countries, the UK and India will focus on research, innovation, and technology to build new capabilities in the defence and security realms. With long-running border issues with China in Eastern Ladakh, India is gradually recognising the value of increased defence and security cooperation with the UK, US, and EU, and the “roadmap” agreement is a significant first step in that direction. 

The Quad, a security alliance involving the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, had convened digitally for the first time during their first formal meeting. Following the summit, the Quad had vowed to work together on telecommunications, especially to expand and diversify 5G supply chains in order to counter China’s dominance. Despite the fact that the alliance did not specifically reference China, all four nations have banned Huawei’s 5G technology, acknowledging rising concerns and a shifting security paradigm. Increased defence cooperation between the UK and India will be crucial to the UK’s success in the Indo-Pacific area, and the deteriorating ties between India and China give a fresh chance to do so. 

Current Scenario:

Following a summit in New Delhi, recently, Britain and India have inked a new defence cooperation pact and  finalised a free trade agreement, which shall be implemented by the end of the year. The arrangement relies on an open general export licence for India to reduce delivery times for guns and other defence equipment. At the moment, only the European Union and the United States have such permits. According to the British High Commission, part of the British offer includes “next-generation” defence and security collaboration spanning land, sea, air, space, and cyber. The agreement, according to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, would assist New Delhi shift away from its reliance on Russia by boosting economic and defence relations with the West, including British backing for India’s domestic weapon manufacture.

The leaders have emphasised on the importance of strong defence industrial collaboration for manufacturing defence equipment, systems, spare parts, components, aggregates, and other related products and key capabilities under the Make-in-India programme, which includes co-development, indigenization, technology transfer, and the formation of joint ventures to meet the needs of India’s and other countries’ armed forces. They mentioned cooperation in important vital sectors including modern fighter aircraft and advanced core technology for jet engines. Both parties committed to collaborate bilaterally and with important partner nations to ensure Indian business had the best possible access to technology. Prime Minister Modi appreciated the United Kingdom’s offer of a ‘open general export licence’ to enable technical collaboration with India, as well as India’s open participation in the UK’s aviation and navy shipbuilding programmes.

Both nations have expressed zero tolerance for terrorism in all its forms – and for all those who encourage, support and finance terrorism or provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups – whatever their motivation may be. They have called upon all countries to work together to root out terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupt terrorist networks and their financing channels, and halt cross-border movement of terrorists. The condemnation was reiterated for the terrorist attacks in India and the UK, including the Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. The importance of perpetrators of terrorist attacks being systematically and expeditiously brought to justice, and agreeing to work together to take concerted action against globally proscribed terrorist entities and individuals, is being emphasised by the two nations. The gratitude for the continuous collaboration through the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (JWG-CT) is tremendous, particularly in terms of exchanging information and intelligence on terror organisations and persons. The two nations have agreed to form a counter-extremism sub-group within this framework in order to strengthen cooperation between the two sides in ensuring that all possible actions are taken against groups and individuals based in or operating out of either country who seek to incite violent extremism and terrorism, as well as those involved in financing such activities.

Conclusion:

The India-UK defence partnership will no longer be restricted to a buyer-seller relationship in the future. It will not, however, be limited to defence manufacturing. The two nations have the capacity to establish a genuinely comprehensive strategic relationship in action via close maritime cooperation and a coordinated approach to ensuring regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

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