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Turkey is highly active in creating new systems, including high-tech equipment, using domestic resources, Turkey’s defence and aerospace exports are likely to top $4 billion by the end of the year 2022. Turkey is not only exporting these technologies, but it is also educating allies in how to use them. Turkey aims to train partner commanders and troops because it will have enough clout in the future to not only integrate those forces into its defence sector but also to strengthen its political influence in critical ally nations. 

While Turkey continues to rely largely on foreign sources for a large portion of its military hardware and technology. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Turkey intends to abolish its military industry’s reliance on foreign suppliers by 2023, the centennial of the Turkish republic’s founding. The private defence industry in Turkey, the likes of FNSS, Otokar, BMC, and Nurol Makina specialise in 4×4, 6×6, and 8×8 armoured platforms, tracked infantry combat vehicles, and main battle tanks and weapon systems in Turkey’s defence sector. These systems are sold to a broad range of consumers across the world, in addition to its National Security Forces. The most notable product samples of the Turkish Defense Industry competing in worldwide markets are 8×8 PARS, 6×6 PARS, 6X6 ARMA; 4×4 COBRA, EJDER YALCIN, VURAN; ALTAY MBT and KAPLAN Medium Tanks.

On the contrary, there is an increased usage of drones for duties ranging from intelligence collection and surveillance to border control, as well as their adaptability in counterterrorism and military operations. This tendency is amplified by the effective integration of advances in data management and artificial intelligence with drone technology, which has been dubbed a “renaissance” in the industry. Turkey has its sights set on this industry and is attempting to remain ahead of the competition by releasing new-generation drones with increased capabilities that make use of these advancements. The diverse range of drones created by Turkish firms has become the face of Turkey’s burgeoning national military sector. The Turkish arms exports market, which had previously been dominated by small arms and armoured personnel carriers, has now expanded to encompass drones, missiles, frigates, and other high-end military systems, with submarine sales on the cards. Turkish companies’ varied variety of drones has become the face of Turkey’s developing national defence business. The Turkish weapons export business, which was formerly dominated by small arms and armoured personnel carriers, has now grown to include drones, missiles, frigates, and other high-end military equipment, with submarine sales on the horizon.

Turkey’s military industry has made significant strides in developing USV capabilities. The first project, ULAQ, is presently in mass production after passing all testing and being sea-tested. The ULAQ was offered to NATO nations last month by a joint venture of ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defence, and it is seen as a formidable contender to dominate this area. The NB57 ASW and RD09 ASuW USVs are other projects unveiled by Turkey’s premier military firm Aselsan in July 2021. This summer, Aselsan’s project partner, Sefine Shipyard, cut the first steel for the boats. Apart from these projects, Aselsan debuted its “Albatros-S” USV Swarm idea during the IDEF-2021 military expo in Istanbul in August 2021. While Albatros-S is a research and development project, it is also compatible with other USV initiatives and Albatros-S unmanned surface boats. The fourth proposal came from Dearsan Shipyard, which on December 23 announced a new family of armed unmanned surface boats (USVs), the USV 15, on its social media sites.

Meteksan Defence Industry Inc., a Turkish defence corporation, has been working with NAZAR, a new ground-based laser system. The NAZAR, one of Turkey’s most intriguing defence concepts. The land-based NAZAR System was exhibited for the first time at the Meteksan Defence booth at the IDEF 2021 Exhibition, having been developed within the scope of the 1st Phase of NAZAR Project signed between the Presidency of Defence Industries of the Republic of Turkey and Meteksan Defence in recent years. To safeguard vital bases and infrastructure, the land-based NAZAR System delivers broadband state-of-the-art laser soft-kill capabilities against EO/IR guided missiles. With its laser soft-kill capacity, the NAZAR Project, which features a technology that only a few nations in the world are working on, is seen as a strategically important project for Turkey. The system has been designed to detect EO and IR-guided missiles and to employ laser blinding and soft-kill tactics against missiles with this capability. As a result, EO/IR guided missiles will be able to be neutralised from a long distance.

NAZAR has been designed to be effective not just against known EO/IR guided missiles, but also to include reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that will give it an edge against asymmetric threats due to its broadband operating capacity. To improve overall efficiency, the system will be able to function in conjunction with other sensors and systems.

Conclusion:

Turkey’s attempts to modernise and strengthen its national defence infrastructure have yielded very effective achievements in a number of crucial sectors. To address the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces using local sources, key defence industrial organisations have been developed, each of which fills a significant gap in their area of operation. Nonetheless, Turkey’s drones and armoured vehicles appear to have the proper mix of pricing, capability, and reputation to pique the interest of forces across the world. While the prowess and acceleration in technology and equipment innovation will not only build a strong military sector, it will also place Turkey’s defence industry among the leading exporters, further cementing Turkey’s worldwide status as a producer of high-quality, inexpensive specialised weaponry.

All revenue and capital expenditure on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces of defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects, and paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped, and ready for military operations, is referred to as defence expenditure. It typically reflects a country’s perception of the possibility of threats against it, as well as the level of aggressiveness it desires to use. It also provides an estimate of how much funding should be allocated for the future year. A budget’s size also reflects an organization’s capacity to support military actions. The size of that entity’s economy, other financial pressures on that entity, and the government’s or people’s willingness to pay such military activities are among the factors.

  • Capital expenditure refers to the money spent by the government on the development of machinery, equipment, buildings, health facilities, education, and other similar projects. It also includes the price of acquiring long-term assets like land and defence equipment, as well as government investments that will generate future revenues or dividends. These expenses result in the creation of assets, which allow the economy to produce income by expanding and improving production facilities and improving operational efficiency. It also improves labour participation, examines the economy, and boosts the economy’s future ability to create more.
  • Revenue expenditure refers to the portion of government spending that does not result in the creation of assets; such expenditures are spent to fulfil the government’s running needs. Salaries, salaries, pensions, subsidies, and interest are all examples of revenue expenditures. 

According to new figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, total worldwide military expenditure grew to $1981 billion in 2020, up 2.6 per cent in real terms from 2019. (SIPRI). The United States, China, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom were the top five spenders in 2020, accounting for 62 per cent of worldwide military spending. 

India’s budget allocation has continually increased over time. Between 2011-12 and 2020-21, defense spending climbed by 127 per cent. The distribution of this allocation between revenue and capital spending, on the other hand, is skewed, with revenue expenditure expanding faster than capital expenditure. The key driver of greater revenue expenditure growth is increased spending on defense pensions. To achieve India’s new set aim, ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat,’ the country’s drive toward an enduring indigenous defense manufacturing industry, as well as to build a strong upholding for the new system, more revenue spending will be required. India is also one of the world’s largest importers of military equipment. The nation has aimed to bolster the expenditure by increasing private sector involvement in defense production and research and development. Manufacturing still is moving slowly, but research and development is gaining traction. India’s total defense budget has increased at a rate of 9% per year over the last 10 years. 

Between 2011-12 and 2018-19, defence revenue spending increased by 140 per cent, while capital expenditure increased by 101 per cent. During the same time period, the percentage of the total defence budget spent on pensions increased from 18 per cent to 26 per cent.

Furthermore, China’s, regional expenditure growth slowed in 2020 as countries like Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia lowered their defence budgets in order to finance emergency relief efforts in the aftermath of the outbreak. The majority of the time, expected growth was slashed rather than actual cutbacks to the previous year’s budget. Asia’s defence expenditure growth slowed to 4.3 per cent in 2020, down from 4.6 per cent in 2019, as a result of the slowdown in China and the rest of the region. Despite this, the region’s share of global defence spending is expected to rise to 25.0 per cent in 2020, from 17.8 per cent in 2010 and 23.2 per cent in 2015. Despite increased investment in Europe, this is expected to remain relatively flat in 2021. 

While in real terms, total European defence spending had increased by 2.0 per cent in 2020. This was a relatively smaller increase than the 4.1 per cent increase witnessed in 2019, and Europe’s proportion of global defence spending declined somewhat in 2020, from 17.8% to 17.5 per cent. However, over the previous years, average spending across European NATO members has gradually climbed as a percentage of GDP, rising from 1.25 per cent in 2014 to 1.52 per cent in 2019 and rising further to 1.64 per cent in 2020. This is still well below the NATO recommendation that its members aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence, despite the significant 7.0% average economic contraction expected in 2020. When it comes to spending on defence equipment, NATO’s European members maintained the higher investment share of defence spending that they achieved in 2019, allocating 23% on average in 2020, beyond the NATO-recommended level of 20%.

The defence expenditures in the Middle East and North Africa have declined, falling to US$150 billion (excluding security expenditure), while the percentage of global defence spending fell to 8.9%, down from 10.5 per cent in 2017. Despite dedicating by far the highest share of economic production to defence, at 5.2 per cent of GDP, compared to the world average of 2.08 per cent, the area continues to struggle. Other oil-dependent economies began to feel the pinch as well. Following a significant 3.8 per cent real rise in the core ‘national defence’ budget in 2020, Russia was only able to execute a minuscule 1.4 per cent increase in 2021, resulting in a 3.6 per cent real reduction. Total Russian military spending (which includes pensions, military housing, and health and social assistance) is expected to drop from over 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2020 to under 3.8 percent in 2023.

Conclusion:

Peace is important to maintain fruitful trade relations in a given region. However, this peace can only be achieved if military spending is done. Military spending builds military might. This power acts as a deterrent for aggressors. In the absence of military spending, opponents may view the nation as a soft target. Hence, even though local defense spending may be more expensive, it creates more value in the form of more robust national security and fewer disruptions to trade and commerce. If the defense system of a country is fully integrated, there are economic benefits to it. Defense expenditure is, without a doubt, an unambiguous demonstration of power, as current patterns of growing defense spending shows.

The manner in which war is fought is evolving. While technological advancements in the twentieth century helped to level the playing field between states, rapid progress in the recent two decades has made it clear that possessing a state’s money, or even being a state, is no longer a need for influencing global politics. Technology has been the great equaliser and driving force in bringing new participants into the field of battle. It’s unsurprising that we’re seeing a shift in how western countries are organising and developing their defence forces in response to these new threats. The capacity of a country to use its scientific and technology foundation to investigate, experiment, analyse, and exploit new technologies, methods, and tactics will be critical to its operational advantage, security, and prosperity in the future. A national defensive strategy must also ensure independence in defence development and procurement. As technology becomes more democratised, it is no longer only countries with vast financial resources that may arm themselves with weapons of war; it can now be done on an individual level as well. These aren’t your typical gun or tank; instead, they’re non-unique computers that enable bad actors the power to inflict harm on their targets, whether they’re governments or proxies for governments, through skilful usage. This type of behaviour is now considered to occur in the grey zone, which is a space where bad actors can target political, economic, and military tools without triggering a traditional reaction or even being recognised as formal acts of aggression.

Britain’s military has been focused on transitioning towards a more deadly, hi-tech, and drone-enabled combat. A year after formally exiting the EU, the United Kingdom is attempting to define and establish its new role in the world. An implication towards using their unique chance to use their knowledge of science and technology for the improvement of defence and security capabilities, demonstrating their capacity to remain a reliable partner to its European and global allies. It has also promised to invest in cyberspace, chemical, biological, and radioactive technologies, innovative weapons, and system integration.

The UK’s capacity to combine enhanced training with faster adoption of science and technology, particularly those currently in use by its adversaries, will be a vital boost to its preparation. The UK, which has a history of being hesitant to adopt new technologies, has to do more to speed up adoption and guarantee that troops have the tools they need to train and build skills to face more complex technology-based assaults. To accomplish this, a road must be established for the rapid transfer of commercial sector technology to military and security applications in order to strengthen the military’s ability to respond effectively to attacks that originate in the civil sector. Being an early adopter of disruptive types of technology will put the UK ahead of its enemies and give it a leading position among its allies in this field.

Experimentation has grown increasingly common as a result of the success of Silicon Valley’s rapid prototyping and innovation cultures — fail fast, learn quickly, and improve. Several multidisciplinary international exercises, such as the Unmanned Warrior exercise, which offered a testing ground for unmanned systems, and Formidable Shield, which tested eight NATO nations’ defence capabilities against ballistic missiles, have already demonstrated its utility in defence. These help to speed up the development and integration of new technologies and operational ideas by allowing them to be tested in a safe and controlled environment. Personnel may train with limited or high-value assets using virtual and constructive simulations, and real training capabilities can be customised to match changing operational demands. Throughout, a technology-agnostic approach should be followed, with diverse manufacturers’ training systems, simulators, and equipment being integrated to provide the most effective synthetic representation feasible.

By the conclusion of the first year, the country hopes to have made significant progress on this plan. Creating a strategy implementation plan, establishing clear policy views on the important capabilities that the government must maintain, offering direction to academics and businesses on priority areas, and renewing the government’s technological incubation programme are all examples of progress. However, more engagement with people in the industry is required to properly incorporate innovations from the civic sector. Close communication and collaboration between all stakeholders are crucial to ensure development and innovation stay mission-focused. Defence and security services have firsthand knowledge of their operational issues, while academics and industry are always investigating new solutions. And it all boils down to the necessity for a more modernised training programme, both in terms of methodologies and technologies. Training collaborations with businesses and allies will be able to provide the tactical training required to face genuine threats while also strengthening cross-government, inter-Service, and international cooperation. Defence enterprises must work together to agree on common standards and principles for the use of collaborative environments, threads and twins. Only once this is understood, and collaborative culture is embraced, can the time-saving, cost-saving, and performance-enhancing benefits of collaborative training be realised.

Conclusion:

The United Kingdom’s new warfare strategy is in keeping with the direction in which warfare is moving, as well as the manner necessary to confront the growing number of threats. The introduction of science and technology as a pillar will provide the necessary foundation for building a successful defence in the new world’s workings. To confront adversaries that increasingly employ modern media to launch attacks, a well-developed technological capability will be necessary. The first step toward a strong future defence is to recognise the possibilities of science and technology. Strengthening the United Kingdom’s leadership in science and technology offers a foundation on which it can stand shoulder to shoulder with other nations as it redefines its position in the international arena.